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Abstract
Recent evidence shows that the “home bias puzzle” in international
t r a d em a yb ea s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h em e r ep r e s e n c eo fn a t i o n a lb o r d e r s
(McCallum (1996)). In this paper we provide a theoretical framework
to explain why borders may matter so much for trade. Our argument is
that even between perfectly integrated and similar countries the legal
system di¤ers, so that legal costs are higher when business is done
abroad. Using a matchig model of trade, we show that the home bias is
associated with both less searching foreign sellers in the home market
and a lower probability of cross-border matches being accepted. In
industries characterized by high turnover legal costs may reduce trade
because reducing the mass of searching foreign sellers and increasing
at the same time that of searching domestic sellers.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The “home bias puzzle” is one of the most intriguing unsettled issues in
international trade. The traditional view is that national borders matter
for trade because their existence is associated with discriminatory policies
and physical distance. This view, rather common in theory, has been chal-
lenged in applied work. Trade costs alone cannot explain fully the extent
to which domestically produced tradable goods are over-represented in the
consumption of residents. This mismatch has been often solved in applied
equilibrium analysis resorting to “Armington preferences”, i.e., by assuming
that, for some reason, individuals’ residents are biased towards domestically
produced goods.1 This explanation is probably relevant when we consider
trade ‡ows between countries that di¤er considerably in income per-capita,
geography, or history, less when we consider similar countries. In some cases,
relying to a bias in tastes is simply an ad-hoc short-cut.
The dissatisfaction with a taste-based explanation for the observed home-
bias in consumption …nds strong support in recent evidence. McCallum
(1995), estimating the volume of trade through a gravity equation across
US States and Canada provinces, found that the presence of the national
border reduces trade by a factor of twenty. This result is rather surpris-
ing. The mere fact that the counterpart is located across the border reduces
dramatically the volume of trade even between countries like the US and
Canada, that have almost completely liberalized trade and that are quite
homogenous culturally. These …ndings stimulated debate and further re-
search. Subsequent work con…rmed that the extent of the ”border e¤ect”
is substantial, even though probably not striking as found by McCallum
(1995).2 Overall, consensus is shaping around the idea that much of the
observed home bias is simply related to the presence of borders. But then,
why do national borders matter so much?
Several explanations have been proposed recently to account for the ob-
served border-related home bias. Anderson and van Wincoop (2000) …nd an
explanation for the very large extent of the border e¤ects between Canada
and the US by implementing a theoretically founded gravity equation, taking
into account relative distance across countries with appropriate functional
forms. According to this analysis, the surprisingly high border e¤ect found
in McCallum (1995) can be explained by omitted variables and the small
size of the Canadian economy. Also in Anderson and van Wincoop (2000),
1There are several plausible reasons that may explain a bias in tastes: habit, culture,
or consumption externalities.
2Helliwell (1996) analyses trade between US States and Canada provinces using 1993-
1996 data, i.e., relative to the post-Nafta period. In this study, national borders reduce
trade by a factor of twelve. As for other OECD countries whose trade data are not
available at a subnational level, Wei (1996), Evans (2000) and Chen (2000) provide indirect
evidence that national borders reduce trade substantially, but less compared with the
results obtained by McCallum (1996) and Helliwell (1996).
2however, it is found that borders reduce trade across national boundaries by
substantial magnitudes. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) emphasize that what
matters to explain this puzzle is not the level of the level of trade costs per-
se, but their interaction with the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods. They claim that plausible values for trade costs and
substitution elasticities can account for much of the observed home-bias.3
This argument, however, still leaves unexplained why the mere presence of
a national border can dramatically reduce trade. Anderson and Marcouiller
(1999) propose a quite di¤erent explanation of the home bias, that does not
rely on the presence of protectionist trade policies, transport costs, or bi-
ased tastes. Their point of departure is that the rule of law is much weaker
when trade is international, compared with domestic trade. The probabil-
ity of expropriation, bribery, theft, is much higher when transactions occur
across the border. Moreover, contracts are more hardly enforceable in a
transnational setting. All this adds costs to international trade. Anderson
and Marcouiller (1999) provide empirical support to their argument show-
ing that, ceteris paribus, trade is dramatically reduced when it occurs with
countries with weak institutions and widespread corruption. This analysis,
however, leaves unexplained why even between highly developed countries
(e.g., between the US and Canada) the presence of national borders can
cause a so strong reduction in trade ‡ows.
In this paper, we develop a model that provides an alternative expla-
nation of the home bias puzzle. Our argument is that national borders
matter for international trade because they draw the frontier between dif-
ferent legal systems. This view is not new. Rodrik (2000, page 179), for
instance, argues that “...national borders demarcate political legal jurisdic-
tions. Such demarcations serve to segment markets in much the way that
transport costs or border taxes do”. The main message from our analysis is
that di¤erences in jurisdictions associated with national borders may lead
to home bias, though in a quite di¤erent way compared with that of tari¤s
or transport costs. Our point of departure is that, as already observed by
Rauch (1996), the international exchange of manufactures does not occur
in organized markets like those of basic commodities. Manufactures di¤er
too much in their quality and characteristics for quoted prices to reveal all
the information required by traders to …nalize their operations. Hence, the
connection between sellers and buyers is often the result of a lengthy search
process. Since this process is costly, successful matches enjoy a rent and
tend to be long lasting. Conversely, unsuccessful matches will be rejected
by the parties. This is especially true when trading occurs in sophisticated
goods such as machines or capital equipments. In this context, the terms
3For instance, using CES preferences, a value of (iceberg) trade costs of 25% and one of
the substitution elasticity of 6 one obtains that the share of expenditure in foreign goods
is about 40%.
3of exchange can only be …xed ex-post, after the realization of a satisfactory
match. Thus, the price at which trade occurs re‡ects the relative bargaining
power of buyers and sellers, which is shaped by their outside options. Parties
always have the option not to ful…ll their obligations. However, by doing
that, they will be confronted with legal sanctions. It is easy to understand
why borders do matter in this context. When a transaction occurs across the
border, it involves di¤erent jurisdictions, and the legal costs in case of trial
are higher. This results into a shift of bargaining power in favor of the party
that can gain from opportunistic behavior, into a lower incentive to search
for business partners abroad, and then into a reduction of cross-border trade
‡ows. It is to note that this change in bargaining power would not realize
in case of trade costs associated only with transport costs or border taxes.
In our model, it is the possibility of reneging on international contracts that
shape the outside options available to traders and that are responsible for
t h eh o m eb i a si nt r a d e‡ o w s .
A basic assumption of our model is that commercial disputes occurring
across the border are more costly than disputes occurring within the bor-
ders, and that these extra costs are not shared equally between buyers and
sellers. Available evidence shows that that litigations initiated by foreigners
have a higher probability of success (Clermont and Eisenberg (1996)). This
regularity is consistent with the assumption that the legal costs to solve
commercial disputes are higher for transactions occurring across the border.
International law-suits will in fact be pursued more seldom, only when the
probability of success is high enough. We consider the case in which it is the
seller (the exporter) that bears the biggest share of this extra cost. There
are several reasons that induce to think that this is the most likely case.
It happens that in international transactions the delivery of goods comes
before their e¤ective payment. It follows that is it is the buyer the one that
can gain from opportunistic behavior. Even when documentary credit is
used, the seller still risk that the buyer claims that the occurrence of some
contingency has altered the agreed terms of exchange (e.g., deterioration
of quality). In a large number of instances will then be the seller to initi-
ate an international dispute. Being the suing party, the seller is likely to
bear a larger portion of the trial costs compared with the buyer, since the
dispute must involve heterogenous legal systems.4 This asymmetric posi-
tion of sellers and buyers in international trade is re‡ected in public policies
aimed at facilitating international transactions. While it is quite common
the public support to export credit and insurance, similar practices targeted
to importers are very seldom used.
4An alternative is that of international arbitration occurring in a third country (e.g.,
at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris). Evidence shows that international
arbitration is quite costly, and used only in case of large transactions (see, e.g., Casella
(1992, 1996)).
4We build a model of international trade where matching between (ex-
ante) heterogenous buyers and sellers occurs randomly. The mechanics of the
model are similar to those commonly used to analyze equilibrium unemploy-
ment (e.g., Marimon and Zilibotti (1999)). A matching function summarizes
t h en u m b e ro fr a n d o mm a t c h e sr e a l i z e dp e ru n i to ft i m eb e t w e e ns e a r c h i n g
buyers and sellers. Sellers are characterized by the variety of the supplied
good, and buyers by the variety they would ideally buy. Matches may there-
fore be “good” or “bad”, depending on whether they occur between “close”
or “distant” parties along the product variety dimension. Since search is
costly, only su¢ciently satisfactory matches will result in a business relation.
Buyers may be matched with domestic or foreign sellers. Exporters have to
pay higher legal costs compared with domestic sellers to sue a buyer that
behaves opportunistically, refusing to pay the due price. We show that this
asymmetry in legal costs translates into a loss of bargaining power for sellers
doing business abroad, and into the emergence of home bias. The home bias
shows up in both a lower probability for each buyer to be matched with
a foreign seller and in a higher probability for a cross-border match to be
rejected. Asymmetries in legal costs have a direct negative e¤ect on the en-
try of foreign sellers and their conditions for accepting matches with buyers,
but also an indirect, ambiguous e¤ect on the behavior of domestic sellers,
through the bargaining power of buyers. Comparative statics performed
numerically show that legal costs will reduce international trade especially
in industries characterized by high turnover and where existing business re-
lations are easily destroyed and replaced by new ones. In such industries,
as trial costs rise, the home bias may increase disproportionately because
of a simultaneous lower entry of foreign sellers and higher entry of domestic
sellers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we develop the model. In section 3 we characterize equilibrium and qualify
the emergence of home bias. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a world populated by (ex-ante) heterogenous buyers and sellers.
Sellers supply di¤erentiated goods, and buyers are heterogenous in terms of
t h eg o o d s ’v a r i e t yt h e yl i k em o s t .S e l l e r sm a ye i t h e rb ed o m e s t i co rf o r e i g n .
Buyers and sellers are matched randomly. Some matches are lucky, and
generate a high surplus, others are unlucky. Hence, whenever a match occur,
the buyer has to decide whether to start business with the matched buyer
or to wait for a better match. When a buyer and a seller start a business
relation, they agree to exchange at each time one unit of the good, until their
relation is randomly destroyed. International trade is free. Moreover, we
assume away transport costs or any other cost related to physical distance.
5Nonetheless, doing business with domestic agents or foreigners matters in
our model. The reason is that we consider countries that are characterized
by di¤erent legal systems. Due to such di¤erences, doing business abroad
entails higher legal costs in case of default of one of the parties.
2.1 The Economy
We consider a world with two countries (regions), each populated by a unit
continuum of sellers’ and buyers’ types. The two economies are identical
in all respects, so that we can concentrate the analysis on one of them
only. There are two goods: one di¤erentiated good and one homogenous
commodity, that we call henceforth the numeraire. Buyers derive utility
both from the di¤erentiated good and the numeraire, while sellers only like
the numeraire. Utility of both buyers and sellers is additive in the two
goods and linear in the numeraire. At each instant of time, if matched with
a partner, each buyer consumes one unit of the di¤erentiated good and each
seller sells one unit. Sellers may either sell to home buyers or to foreign
buyers. All agents are in…nitely-lived and discount the future at rate r.
Each seller is characterized by the variety of the good she supplies; each
buyer is characterized by the variety of the good which is most preferred to
him. Sellers and buyers are uniformly distributed over a unit length circle.
At each point on the circle, there is a unit mass of buyers, while the mass
of domestic and foreign sellers is determined endogenously. The larger the
distance between the ideal variety of a buyer and the variety which is actually
purchased, the lower her instant utility. The distance is measured by the
length of the shortest arc between the location of the ideal variety and the
one which is bought. Let c i;j be the length of the arc between a seller’s type i
and a buyer’s type j. Then, since agents are distinguished by one particular
variety located around the circle, we have that c i;j 2 [0;1=2]. We de…ne
by ½ :[ 0 ;1=2] ! [½;½] ½ R+ the function mapping the distance between a
buyer from her seller into the buyer’s instant utility. This function is such
that ½(0) = ½ and ½(1=2) = ½ ,w h e r e0 <½< ½<1; and that ½0 < 0:
Hence, we call ½(c i;j) the instant utility function.
In the economy, there is only one production factor: labor. The nu-
meraire is produced 1:1 out of labor. The di¤erentiated manufacture is
produced under constant returns to scale with marginal costs equal to c for
all varieties. Henceforth, we will assume that some varieties, but not neces-
sarily all, can potentially be sold with a positive pro…t to a given buyer, i.e.,
that ½>c¸ ½. Each agent is endowed with a su¢cient amount of (indi-
visible) labor to allow for the purchase of any variety and exclude negative
consumption.5
5As will be clear in the following analysis, this is insured when the labor endowment
of each agent is greater than max[°;½]; where ° denotes the instant cost piad by sellers
when searching for a buyer.
6In each country, sellers of each type may either be domestic or foreign.
The variables referred to, respectively, the home and the foreign country are
labelled with superscripts H and F.W ea l s od e n o t eb yH and F the set of
domestic and foreign sellers.
At each period in time, some sellers and buyers are randomly matched
and some existing matches are randomly destroyed. The rate at which
matching occur is not a¤ected by the location of agents on the circle where
goods’ varieties are represented.
Sellers choose at each instant about entry. As soon as sellers enter in one
location, they have to search for a buyer. Their search costs are represented
by a ‡ow of ° units of the numeraire per unit of time. A seller, after being
matched with a buyer, has to decide whether to accept entering a business
relation with the buyer –maintaining this business relation until the match
is destroyed– or to wait for a better match. If the seller accepts the match,
she posts a price to the buyer.6 Then, it is the buyer that has to accept or
refuse the deal. If the buyer agrees, a business relation is started, and the
good is delivered. At this point, the buyer has to decide about her business
conduct. Buyers may either be “honest” or “dishonest”. A honest buyer pays
for the delivered good, while a dishonest buyer refuses to pay. Whenever
a buyer refuses payment to the seller, the business relation is terminated
at a higher rate. The behavior of the buyer is veri…able by a court, which
imposes the due payment to the sued seller in case of dishonest conduct.
After dishonest behavior by the buyer, either the parties reach a pre-trial
agreement through which the buyer directly compensates the seller, or the
seller sues the buyer to the court. We assume that trial costs are higher in
case of an international lawsuit. Without loss of generality, the legal costs
for a domestic lawsuit are assumed to be zero, while those that a seller has
to pay for in case of an international lawsuit are equal to a ‡ow equal to 2¢
.7 Figure 1 describes the sequence of actions.
Insert Figure 1 about here
6The assumption that sellers make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to buyers simpli…es the
analysis but is not crucial. The main qualitative conclusions are obtained allowing parties
to share the surplus from the match according to some given rule.
7The assumption that it is the seller to bear the cost of international disputes is not
necessary to obtain the emergence of home bias in our model, provided that these costs
are not shared equally between the parties. In case it is the buyer that bear the legal
costs, then it will be the seller to have a possible gain from behaving opportunistically,
delivering an amount of the good lower than agreed.
72.2 Matching
Buyers and sellers are randomly matched and separated at each instant of
time. Hence, in each moment, both sellers and buyers are either matched or
searching. The mass of instantaneous matches between type-j buyers and
type-i sellers is an increasing function of the mass of searching type-j buyers
and type-i sellers. More formally, let b(j) and s(i) be, respectively, the mass
of searching buyers of type j and sellers of type i, the matching function
m[s(i);b(j)];m: R+ £ [0;1] ! R+, speci…es the mass of instant matches
between buyers of type j and sellers of type i. We assume m[s(i);b(j)] to
be increasing in both its arguments, to exhibit constant return to scale,
and to respect Inada conditions. Let µ (i;j) ´ s(i)=b(j) and q [µ(i;j)] ´
m[s(i);b(j)]
s(i) . Then, q[µ(i;j)] represents average ‡ow of matches (Poisson rate)
for a searching seller of type i with a buyer of type j; while µ(i;j)q[µ(i;j)]
are the average instant matches for a buyer of type j with a seller of type
i.8 In case of honest behavior, buyer-seller matches are destroyed at each
time period at the Poisson rate d assumed to be lower than unity. If a buyer
behaves opportunistically and refuses to pay the delivered good, without
loss of generality, the match is assumed to be destroyed at a Poisson rate
equal to 1.
2.2.1 Sellers
Recall that once entered, sellers have to search for a buyer. We restrict the
analysis to an economy in the steady state. The steady-state value function
f o ras e a r c h i n gs e l l e rs u p p l y i n gv a r i e t yi belonging to country k, k = H;F,
(denoted by ik) is the sum of the instant gains losses (¡°) and the option
























is decreasing with s(ik),
entry in the supply of any variety i will occur until V(ik)=0 .
The value function of sellers depends both on whether the match occurs
domestically or across the border, and on whether the matched buyer be-
haves honestly (paying after delivery) or dishonestly (refusing to pay). We
will limit the analysis to empirically consistent cases in which buyers always
prefer to behave honestly. Appendix A.1. identi…es su¢cient conditions
for honest behavior to occur at equilibrium. The value function of a seller
8Note that, from the Inada conditions assumed to be respected by m(:;:),i tm u s tb e
that lim
µ(i;j)!0
q[µ(i;j)] = +1 and lim
µ(i;j)!+1
q[µ (i;j)] = 0.
8supplying variety ik matched with a buyer with ideal variety j will thus be
given by




];k = H;F (2)
where p(ik;j) is the price charged by a type-ik seller to a type-j buyer, and d
is the separation rate. The price p(ik;j) is set unilaterally by the seller, who
is in the position to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the buyer. Each seller
has therefore to solve the problem of the buyer to set optimally p(ik;j).
2.2.2 Buyers
After the price is posted, the matched buyer has to decide, in sequence,
whether to start business with a matched seller and, if yes, whether to behave
honestly or dishonestly. As soon as the business relation starts, the good
is delivered. A honest buyer pays the price posted by the seller p(ik;j).A
dishonest buyer refuses to pay. Since the behavior of the buyer is veri…able,
the seller can obtain the due payment by suing the buyer. However, since
the trial is costly and both parties are rational, they will always reach a
pretrial agreement. We assume that the surplus from avoiding the trial is
shared equally. Denote by h(ik;j), k = H;F, the compensation that the
parties agree the buyer should give the seller in order to avoid the trial. In
case of a purely domestic match (both parties belong to the same country),
we necessarily have h(iH;j)=p(iH;j) since the trial is assumed to have
no costs. When the match is between two parties belonging to di¤erent
c o u n t r i e sw eh a v ei n s t e a dh(iF;j)=p(iF;j)¡¢, i.e., a pre-trial settlement
which is lower than the posted price.9
Denoting by Ch(ik;j) the value function of a honest buyer of type j that
is matched with a seller of type ik,w eg e t
rCh(ik;j)=½(d ik;j) ¡ p(ik;j) ¡ d[Ch(ik;j) ¡ W(j)];k = H;F (3)
where W(j) is the value function of buyer j if searching. The welfare of
a buyer that behaves opportunistically depends crucially on whether she is
matched with a domestic or with a foreign seller. Denoting by Cd(ik;j) the
welfare of a dishonest buyer of type j; we have, respectively, in the case of
ad o m e s t i ca n dac r o s s - b o r d e rm a t c h
rCd(iH;j)=½( d iH;j) ¡ p(iH;j) ¡ [Cd(iH;j) ¡ W(j)]; (4)
rCd(iF;j)=½( d iF;j) ¡ p(iF;j)+¢¡ [Cd(iF;j) ¡ W(j)]: (5)






F;j) ¡ c ¡ (p(i
F;j) ¡ c ¡ 2¢):
9When a buyer matched with a home seller decides not to pay, the settlement
is the price p(iH;j),b u tt h eb u s i n e s sr e l a t i o ni sb r o k e ni nt h ec u r r e n tp e r i o d
with probability one. As d<1, a home buyer matched with a home seller
will always be honest. Things are di¤erent when the match occurs across
the border, since the required compensation is lower and the instantaneous
surplus for a dishonest buyer is higher. We see that a buyer matched with
a foreign seller will be honest provided Cd · Ch. One checks using Eqs. (3)
and (5) that this condition is met if and only if




Note that honest behavior requires that the rate of match destruction is
higher with a dishonest buyer.
2.3 Pricing
We analyze now the buyers’ decision concerning which match to accept,
i.e., which sellers to accept doing business with, and the pricing decisions
of sellers. Recall that we assumed that the seller makes a take it or leave
it o¤er to the buyer. Therefore, sellers will set the highest price such that
buyers accept the proposed deal. Moreover, we restrict the analysis to cases
in which sellers will be better o¤ by inducing buyers to behave honestly in
case of an across-the-border match.10 In case of, respectively, a domestic









Buyers matched with foreign sellers are in the position to extract a positive
surplus from the match, in spite of the fact that sellers make take-it-or-
leave-it o¤ers. This is required to induce buyers to behave honestly. The
rent appropriated by the buyer increases with ¢ because the higher is ¢
the lower is the compensation in favor of the seller agreed in a pre-trial
settlement in case of dishonest behavior. The rent to the buyer also increases
with d:t h e h i g h e r i s d the lower is the loss to the buyer in terms of an
increased destruction rate in case of dishonest behavior. We see then why
national borders matter in our model. When a transaction is carried out
across the border, the bargaining power is shifted towards the party that
can bene…t from opportunistic behavior: buyers. Note that there is a crucial
di¤erence here with respect to other types of trade costs. If we had assumed,
10Alternative equilibria may exhibit dishonest behavior by some or all of the buyers.
These possible equilibria will not be considered in the following analysis.
10for instance, higher marginal costs for doing business abroad, we wouldn’t
have obtained such shift of bargaining power, with di¤erent results. In
the present set-up, transport costs or border taxes would simply increase
marginal costs and reduce the rents captured by sellers from they business
relations, without a¤ecting the way rents are shared between buyers and
sellers.
Since we keep perfect symmetry in the model, there will be an equal mass
of sellers of all types. Moreover, as all buyers are matched with sellers of
each type at the same rate, we can drop type indices and write µ(iF;j)=µF;
µ(iH;j)=µH. Using symmetry, and noting that the acceptance rule for the
seller is to de…ne a maximum distance from a buyer ¹ nk (k = H;L)a b o v e
which the asset value of the match, J
¡
ik;i k +¹ nk¢
,i sn i l ,w ec a ns i m p l i f y








d¿; k = H;F (7)
where M(ik;x) is the set of buyers’ types whose distance from i is smaller
or equal to x: The asset equation for a searching buyer j, W,i sg i v e nb yt h e








[Ch(¿F;j) ¡ W(j)]d¿: (8)
Moreover, since the expression of (8) looks identical for all j we can drop the
index j and simply write W to denote the asset value for searching buyers.
From equations (3) and (8) we note that








[Ch(¿;j) ¡ W]d¿; (9)
where k = H;F and M(x;j) denotes the set of buyers’ types whose distance
from j is smaller or equal to x. Since the price set by a domestic seller iH
is such that Ch(iH;j)=W; and the one set by a foreign seller is such that
Ch(iF;j)¡W = ¢
1¡d we have from (9) that the price charged by, respectively,










Note that the expression of prices set by both domestic (10) and foreign sell-
ers (11) are lower than the instant utility for the buyer (½(x)). Note that,
keeping constant the quality of matches, the price set by exporters is lower
compared with that …xed by domestic sellers. We thus obtain a “dump-
ing” result, that is explained by the fact that foreign sellers have to leave
some rent to the buyer to induce honest behavior. However, the acceptance
rule of cross-border and domestic matches is determined endogenously in
the model. The average equilibrium price in cross-border business relations
may therefore be on average higher if it is higher the average productiv-
ity of equilibrium cross-border transactions. It is …nally to note that both
in the case of matches within and across the borders an “outside option”
term appears in the expression of prices. The seller will set a price that is
lower the higher is the term ¢=(1¡d) –re‡ecting the amount of the surplus
appropriated by buyers matched with exporters– and the higher the rate
at which a buyer enters a business relation with a foreign partner (given
by the Poisson rate µFq(µF) at which matches arrive times the probability
2nF of having a match which is accepted). This is easily explained. Even
if setting a take-it-or-leave-it price, the seller cannot fully appropriate the
instant surplus from the buyer, since for the latter there is the option value
from waiting for a match with a foreign partner. It is to remark that in
case markets are segmented only because of transport costs or border taxes,
this outside option term would not materialize in the expression of prices.
So, while changes in legal costs ¢ will in general a¤ect the behavior of both
domestic and foreign sellers, in the presence of transport costs or tari¤s,
only the behavior of exporters would be a¤ected.
The candidate equilibrium in which buyers behave honestly that has
been characterized so far can be an actual equilibrium only if no seller has an
incentive to deviate from their price behavior. The only deviation can occur
in case of cross-border matches. When the match occurs within national
borders, in fact, the seller is in the position to fully extract the surplus
from the matched buyer. A lower price would leave some surplus. A higher
price would induce buyers to reject the deal. In case of cross-border matches,
instead, sellers have the alternative option of setting a price higher than (11)
that induces dishonest behavior on the part of the matched buyer. In that
case sellers would set the highest price that still make the deal acceptable
for the matched buyer. Appendix A.1. shows that for small values of legal
costs ¢ a condition (condition (23), that is assumed to hold henceforth)
12can be found that prevent such deviations to occur at equilibrium . The
intuition is that buyers’ rents in case of honest behavior are associated with
legal costs ¢ (check (6)). When such costs are su¢ciently low, sellers would
not gain from deviating to prices higher than (11), because this would result
in a small increase in the rent from the match, too small to compensate for
the instantaneous destruction of the match.
3 Equilibrium
Henceforth, we restrict attention to cases in which cross-border trade takes
place in our economy and in which there is an internal solution for the
equilibrium (i.e., in which ¹ nk 2 (0;1=2), k = H;F). An equilibrium with
cross-border trade boils down to a strictly positive solution (¹ nH;nF;µF;µH)
of the following system
JH(¹ nH)=0 , (12)
JF(nF)=0 , (13)
V H =0 ; (14)
V F =0 ; (15)
where Jk(¹ nk) is the welfare of a seller matched with a buyer at distance ¹ nk
and V k is that of a searching seller, k = H;F. The mass of searching buyers,
b, and that of searching sellers, s(ik), k = H;F, are obtained recursively




s(ik)=0 , where the dots denote
time changes.11
Proposition 1 For small values of legal costs ¢ an equilibrium with honest
behavior and cross-border trade exists and is unique.
Proof: See Appendix A1.
The equilibrium can be characterized graphically. In Figure 2 we show,
separately, in the (¹ nH;µH) and in the (nF;µ F) space, respectively, the equi-
librium for variables relating to domestic and foreign sellers. There, the val-
ues for ¹ nH and nF are implicitly de…ned by equations (12) and (13), while
those of µH and µF are given by (14) and (15). It is shown in Appendix
11Alternatively, as we do in the next section, from the steady-state conditions one may
characterize the mass of matched agents in the economy.
13A1 that while domestic sellers’ variables depend upon (nF;µ F),t h o s er e l a t -
ing to foreign sellers are independent of (¹ nH;µ H). In fact, while the entry
condition and the stopping rule for foreign sellers is not a¤ected by vari-
ables relating to domestic sellers (¹ nH;µH), the decisions of domestic sellers
are a¤ected by nF and µF via the outside option available to buyers. The
pricing equations (10) and (11) show that the rent appropriated by buyers
increase with the Poisson rate of being matched with foreign sellers µFq(
µF) and with the distance below which such matches are accepted nF.N o t e
that while legal costs only have an e¤ect on the decisions of domestic sell-
ers through changes in the outside option of buyers, they a¤ect the entry
condition and the stopping rule of foreign sellers both directly and through
the buyers’ outside option. It is also to note that no outside option e¤ect
would materialize when markets are segmented only because of the exis-
tence of transport costs or border taxes. In such a case, there would just
be a greater marginal costs for sellers when supplying foreign buyers. This
would a¤ect directly the entry decisions of foreign sellers and the acceptance
rules for foreign matches, but would not alter the outside option of buyers,
thus having no e¤ect on (¹ nH;µH).
Appendix A1 shows that whenever nF or µF rise (fall), other things
being equal, ¹ nH and µH fall (rise). A higher value of nF or µF translates
into a higher rate of arrival and acceptance of cross-border matching, and
then into a higher bargaining power for buyers. This explains the reduced
entry rate (lower µH) and the more selective stopping rule (lower ¹ nH)f o r
domestic sellers.
In which way legal costs contribute to segment cross-border trade? How
do they shape the home bias? Comparative statics are quite involved in this
model. While the direct e¤ect of ¢ is unambiguously negative on ¹ nH;µ H
and µF, it is ambiguous on nF (check Appendix A1 and Figure 2). Moreover,
the total e¤ect of ¢ on ¹ nH and µH is hard to assess analytically, since it
also depends on how the equilibrium values of nF and µF are a¤ected. The
next section, after showing that home bias always takes place for ¢ > 0,
performs some comparative statics exercises numerically.
Insert Figure 2 about here
3.1 The Emergence of the Home Bias and its Determinants
De…ne by zH and zF respectively, the mass of matched home and foreign
sellers. At the steady state, zH and zF must be constant. In‡ows and
out‡ows in and from zH and zF must therefore be equal, i.e.,
14dzk = µkq(µk)2nkb; k = H;F (16)
where dzk and µkq(µk)2nkb are, respectively, the number of destroyed and
that of created matches per unit of time. Hence, the trade share at the





The above ratio summarizes the extent to which markets are e¤ectively
integrated. The more the ratio is close to one, the more we can speak
about e¤ective trade integration. Note that the trade share depends both
upon di¤erences between µF and µH and between nF and nH. So, two
factors contribute to shape the degree of trade integration. First, there is the
”relative tightness of the market”, re‡ected in µFq(µF)=µHq(µH). The higher
is this term, the easier it is for a buyer to be matched with a foreign seller
rather than with a domestic one. The second determinant is the “relative
selectivity”, measured by nF=nH, which summarizes the extent to which a
domestic seller requires a successful match to be “closer”, compared with
a foreign seller. It can be shown that the asymmetric pricing behavior we
have previously characterized inevitably leads to home bias because of both
lower market tightness for foreign sellers and a higher required proximity.
Proposition 2 Legal costs ¢ segment markets because of two reasons: i)
buyers are more hardly matched with foreign sellers (µH >µ F); ii) cross-
border matches are more easily rejected (nF < nH).
Proof: See Appendix A2.
There are two self-reinforcing reasons that lead to reduced trade in the
presence of legal costs. The …rst is the fact that the matching is more
di¢cult with foreign sellers. Since an equally productive match is less prof-
itable for a seller if realized with a foreign buyer, in the steady state there
will be less foreign sellers searching for a partner compared with domes-
tic ones. Second, matches between parties belonging to di¤erent countries
will be more easily rejected. Again, since an equally productive match is
less pro…table if realized across the border, it will be accepted only if more
productive, or “closer” than a match occurring within domestic boundaries.
Since changes in relative tightness and in relative selectivity tend to reinforce
each other, there is a legitimate presumption that, as legal costs rise, the
12Further, from the steady-state equality z
H + z








15extent of the home bias may rise substantially. Comparative statics are not
easy performed analytically. However, an insight can be obtained through
numerical simulations, once functional forms are speci…ed for the instant
utility of buyers and the matching function. Consider then a linear instant




, x 2 [0;1=2], and a Cobb-Douglas
matching function, such that q(µ)=µ¡1=2.







































Table 1 : The behavior of the home bias; numerical simulations
r =0 :05;°=0 :5;c=1 ;½=1 ;½ =1 :1:
In Table 1 we provide numerical simulations to assess how the extent of the
home bias is shaped by the presence of legal costs associated with cross-
border trade.13 We consider “small” di¤erential trial costs. The ratio ¢=½
is assumed to be between 1 and 5 per cent. Two cases are considered as far
as parameter d is concerned. One case (d =0 :1) considers small ”turnover”,
i.e. a relatively low value for the rate of match destruction. The other is a
”high turnover” case (d =0 :5).
The mass of searching buyers b always rises with the magnitude of legal
costs ¢. This means that the overall steady state number of business rela-
tions (equal to 1¡ b) falls. Note that the steady state value of b is equal to
d=
£
d + µHq(µH)2nH + µFq(µF)2nF¤
. So, a fall in b must be associated with
a reduction in the number of successful matches for the average searching
buyer. As for the behavior of the mass of searching sellers, we note from the
changes in µH and µF that it is quite di¤erent depending on whether they
13In all cases presented in Table 1 it is checked that condition (23) provided in Appendix
A.1. holds. This conditions guarantees that no deviation is pro…table for sellers in an
equilibrium with buyers behaving honestly.
16are domestic or foreign. The same is observed for nH and nF.W h i l e t h e
entry of foreign sellers drops in all cases (so, µF falls) and also nF unam-
biguously falls, we see that µH and nH fall in the case of low turnover, while
have a non-monotonic behavior in the case of high turnover. In that case,
they fall …rst and then rise. As for the extent of the home bias, (inversely
related to zF=zH) we see that it always rises with ¢, and that can do so
quite dramatically in the case of high turnover.
How can we interpret these results? On the one hand, ¢ rises the out-
side option of buyers directly, thus entailing a reduction in nH and µH.O n
the other hand, rising legal costs ¢ also a¤ect nF and µF, thus a¤ecting
indirectly the outside option of domestic sellers. Since in the simulations in
Table 1 nF and µF appears always to be lowered by ¢,t h i st r a n s l a t e si n t o
reduced bargaining power of buyers, and then into easier entry of domes-
tic sellers (µH tends to rise) and reduced selectivity in accepting matches
(¹ nH tends to rise). The indirect e¤ect on domestic sellers’ variables is thus
positive. In the case of high turnover this indirect e¤ect of ¢ may prevail
over the direct one.14 So, when d is relatively high, “small” legal costs are
su¢cient to choke-o¤ a substantial amount of trade. This is because the
role of the outside option for the buyer gets more important as d rises, thus
l e a d i n gt oas u b s t a n t i a ld r o pi nnF and µF. This, in turn, leads to a strong
indirect e¤ect on the outside option of buyers, and then into a possible drop
in nH and µH as ¢ rise. The fact that µF and nF fall when µH and nH rise
shifts the market towards domestic matches further, reinforcing the extent
of the steady-state home bias.
4 Conclusions
National borders matter for trade. In this paper we o¤er an explanation of
the home bias based on the existence of asymmetries in legal systems across
countries. The starting point of the analysis is that international trade in
many manufacturing sectors does not occur in organized markets like those
of basic commodities. In these sectors, the connection between sellers and
buyers is the result of a costly search process, so that successful matches
enjoy a rent and tend to be long lasting, while unsuccessful matches will be
rejected by the parties. Moreover, the price at which trade occurs re‡ects
the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers, which is shaped by their
outside options. In this context, the change in the legal system associated
with crossing the border translates into a shift of bargaining power towards
the party that has the opportunity to behave opportunistically (buyers), by
refusing to ful…ll the agreed obligations. This reduces cross-border trade for
two reasons. First, sellers prefer to invest resources to search for domestic
14It is to note that this occurs provided that the values for ½; ½,a n dc are su¢ciently
close, as it is in the simulations in Table 1.
17partners, rather than for foreign ones. Second, cross-border matches will
translate into operating business relations more hardly than domestic ones:
only the most productive matches will be accepted. These two reasons
reinforce each other, and can choke-o¤ a large proportion of trade. This is
true especially in the case of sectors characterized by high turnover, where
business relations are not long-lasting. In this case, buyers enjoys a high
outside option and the bargaining power of foreign sellers is weak. As trial
costs rise, the home bias increase disproportionately because of lower entry
of foreign sellers and higher entry of domestic sellers.
There are several implications from the analysis. First, without some de-
gree of e¤ort of sovereign countries to further integrate their economies also
from the viewpoint of the settlement of international disputes, the volume of
cross-border trade is doomed to remain lower, probably substantially lower,
compared with that taking place within national boundaries. Moreover, the
relative importance of law asymmetries in explaining the home bias may not
necessarily fall over time, without harmonization e¤orts. The reason is that
the share of long-distance trade in search-intensive, tailor-made, sophisti-
cated goods tends to increase as a consequence of technological progress,
falling communication costs and manufacturing production reorganization.
In particular, there is evidence of a rising fraction of trade in intermediate
inputs and capital goods associated with outsourcing and “production frag-
mentation” (see, for instance, Feenstra (1998) for a survey on the topic).
Since it is in this type of goods that trading requires a greater search ef-
fort, our analysis suggests that the relative importance of legal asymmetries
in shaping cross-border segmentation of markets may rise as the process
of disintegration of production proceeds. Second, the analysis may help to
identify in which sectors trade is more likely to remain internationally seg-
mented due to asymmetries in law systems. Industries where search matters
and where …rms’ expected life is shorter are those in which border e¤ects
may play a stronger in reducing international trade. Available evidence
shows that average …rms’ size is signi…cantly negatively related to the ex-
tent of border e¤ects (Chen (2000)).15 Since average …rms’ life tend to be
shorter for smaller …rms, this can be an indirect con…rmation that higher
turnover is positively associated with border e¤ects.
15Dummies of product di¤erentiation, instead, do not prove signi…cant in explaining
border e¤ects across sectors (Chen (2000)).
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In a …rst step, we take as given the existence of a candidate equilibrium
with honest equilibrium and show that for small values of legal costs ¢ this
candidate equilibrium can be an actual equilibrium because sellers would not
have an incentive to deviate from their price decisions. In a second step we
show that for small values of ¢ an interior equilibrium with honest behavior
and cross-border trade exists and is unique. There, we show that: i) for any
pair (nF;µF) only one pair of values (¹ nH;µ H) solves (12) and (14); ii) that
a unique pair of values (nF;µ F) solves equations (13) and (15).
Step 1
An equilibrium with honest behavior by all buyers must be such that no
seller has an incentive to deviate from (11), assuming that all other sellers
are setting (11) and that all other buyers are behaving honestly. The price
e p set by a seller matched with a foreign buyer at distance x as a result
of deviation solves CdF(x)=W, where the superscript d and F refers,
respectively to the conjectured behavior on the part of the matched buyer
and to the fact that the match occurs across the border. Since, by refusing
to pay the buyer will have to compensate the buyer with e p¡¢ in a pre-trial
settlement, we must have
rCdF(x)=½(x) ¡ (e p ¡ ¢) + [W ¡ CdF(x)]: (18)
From (8), and since buyers’ surplus is nil in domestic matches, it must be
that rW =2 nFµFq(µF) ¢
1¡d,s ot h a t ,CdF(x)=W yields the following price
set in a deviation




Denote now by JdF(x) and JhF(x) the asset value of the seller when
setting, respectively, the optimal price inducing dishonest and honest be-
havior in the buyer, i.e., (19) and (11). A deviation from an equilibrium
with honest behavior is pro…table as long as JdF(x) >J hF(x). From (14)





where k = F; H: Moreover, recalling that with dishonest behavior the match
is immediately destroyed and that the compensation to the seller will be
e p ¡ ¢ we must have
19JdF(x)=
e p ¡ ¢ ¡ c
r +1
; (21)
Substituting, respectively, (11) in (20) and (19) in (21) after some algebra





(1 +r)(d + r)+( 1¡ d)2nFµFq(µF)
¤
: (22)
It follows that if the condition




(1 +r)(d + r)+( 1¡ d)2nFµFq(µF)
¤
: (23)
holds for all x · nF no deviation can occur from an equilibrium with honest
behavior. When the value of ¢ is su¢ciently small, values for c 2 [½;½)
always exist such that condition (23) is satis…ed for x<1=2.
Step 2.a.T h ev a l u e sf o rnH and nF are implicitly de…ned, respectively,









As ½0 < 0,f o re a c h(nF;µF) if there exists a value for nH (independent
of µH) that solves (26) and that is interior to (0,1/2), this value must be
unique. It is also easily checked that this solution is negatively related to
nF, µF and ¢.












Equation (27) implicitly de…nes µH as a continuous function of nH,a tg i v e n
(nF;µF). By the properties of q(µ) the right hand side of (27) is monoton-
ically decreasing in µH. Furthermore, the right hand side of (27) goes to
in…nity when µH ! 0 a n dt oz e r ow h e nµH ! +1: It follows that, for any
20(nF;µF) and nH t h e r ei sa l w a y sas i n g l ev a l u eo fµH that solves (27). The
right hand side of (27) is trivially monotonically increasing in nH.H e n c e ,
µH is an increasing implicit function of nH.I t i s a l s o c h e c k e d t h a t µH is
negatively related to ¹ nF and µF and positively related to ¢.
Graphically, nH obtained from (26) is a horizontal line in the (¹ nH;µH)
space, while µH obtained from (27) is a positively sloped curve starting from
0. So, at given (nF;µ F) if there is an internal solution (¹ nH;µ H) to (12) and
(14) it must be unique.
Step 2.b. First note that equations (15) and (13) do not depend on
(¹ nH;µ H). Again, (13) can be rewritten as follows




If, given µF, equation (28) has an internal solution, it must be unique. More-
over, one checks that dnF
dµF =
2nF¢(dµFq(µF )=dµF)
(1¡d)½0(nF )¡2µFq(µF)¢ < 0 and that limnF = º
µF!0
;
where º solves ½(º)=c +( r + d) ¢
1¡d. Note that for su¢ciently low values
of ¢ it must be that º>0. Moreover, since c ¸ ½, º · 1=2.A sf o r¢,i t s
e¤ect on nF is negative.












Using the properties of the function q(µ) one checks that the right hand
side of (29) is strictly decreasing in µF: Moreover, the right hand side of
(29) goes to in…nity when µF ! 0 and to zero, a negative …nite value or
¡1 when µF ! +1. Therefore, (29) must have a unique solution µF 2
(0;+1) at given nF. By (25) it is checked that the right hand side of (29)
is monotonically increasing in nF. It follows that the value of µF solving





=£ ,w h e r e£ is a positive constant. As for ¢, after di¤erentiation
it is checked that its e¤ect on µF is negative.
Graphically, nF obtained from (28) is a negatively sloped locus in the
(nF;µF) space, while µF obtained from (29) is a positively sloped one start-
ing from 0. It follows that if nF(µF) de…ned by (28) and µF(nF) de…ned by
(29) cross, they cross only once.
It can then be checked that when ¢ has su¢ciently low values there
is a unique solution to (15) and (13) where nF 2 (0;1=2) and where µF
has a …nite value. Moreover, given the results in step 2.a and c ¸ ½,f o r
21su¢ciently small values of ¢ the value of nH is positive and lower than 1/2
for any possible solution (nF;µ F). It follows that a range of small values
for ¢ exists such that there exists a unique interior solution to the system
given by (12)-(15) (an equilibrium with cross-border trade). Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We show …rst that nF < nH : The values for nH and nF are implicitly
de…ned, respectively, by (12) and (13). Recalling that (24) and (25) must
hold, that both prices are decreasing functions of the distance x,a n dt h a t
pH(x) >p F(x),i tm u s tb et h a tnH > nF.
Second, we can show that µH >µ F.T h e v a l u e s o f µH and µF are













Since the di¤erence pH(x)¡pF(x) is independent of µk (k = H;F), and from
the fact that nH > nF; recalling that q0 < 0 we must have that µH >µ F:
Q.E.D.
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